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I. INTRODUCTION
Humanity is sustained by the sea. Consequently, a large
part of the world's population lives in coastal areas' in order to
exploit the oceans' resources. As vast and inexhaustible as the
those resources may appear, they are in decline, and among the
most depleted resources are its fisheries.2 In particular,
Canada's Grand Banks, one of the world's premiere fishing
grounds, has experienced a precipitous decline in resources.
While the United Nations (UN) and regional fishing organi-
zations have attempted to manage and conserve ocean fisheries,
they have thus far failed to provide adequate conservation. This
failure stems mainly from the antagonism between coastal
states, who claim preferential rights to adjacent sea resources,
and distant water nations, who fish the adjacent seas.3 Under
the freedom of the sea doctrine,4 nations may fish adjacent high
1. PETER WEBER, NET LOSS: FISH, JOBS, AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 5-76
(Worldwatch Paper, No. 120, 1994) (stating that half of the world's population lives
in coastal zones).
2. Michael Parfit, Diminishing Returns, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1995, at 2.
3. Adjacent seas are those high seas adjacent to the coastal state's 200 mile
exclusive economic zone.
4. "Freedom of the high seas" means that any nation may fish and travel the
high seas and that no nation may impede this right. While this right has been di-
luted in the past century through international regulation, nations may continue to
fish and travel the high seas in a reasonable manner. See ALBERT W. KOERS, INTER-
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seas despite the fact that fish taken on these seas often diminish
the stocks within the coastal state's fishery jurisdiction. In the
spring of 1995, this inherent tension between coastal states and
distant water nations culminated in a brief conflict between
Canada and Spain.'
Canada and Spain eventually settled the dispute by focusing
upon the technical impediments to efficient conservation.' How-
ever, they failed to address the volatile issue of coastal states'
preferential rights to adjacent seas stocks and distant water
nations' freedom to fish the adjacent seas. During the dispute,
Spain filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), which is still pending. Independently of this dispute, the
UN convened its Convention on Straddling Stocks and Highly
Migratory Stocks7 in August of 1995. If ratified, it will provide a
global framework for managing straddling stocks, delineating
more precisely the rights and obligations between coastal states
and distant water nations.' In the interim, however, the ICJ's
decision will establish the international norm for governing
straddling stocks.'
This Comment presents a historical perspective on the com-
peting interests of coastal states and distant water nations and
the continued attempts of international law to resolve this con-
flict. Part III discusses Canada's development as a coastal state
and leader in fisheries conservation. Part IV analyzes the Cana-
da-Spain conflict and its subsequent accord. Part V proposes
factors the ICJ should consider when resolving the long-standing
NATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIES: A STUDY OF REGIONAL FISHERIES OR-
GANIZATION 15-17 (1973).
5. See Parfit, supra note 2, at 10. Other international confrontations have
recently arisen, including a Russian borderguard ship that shot at two Japanese
vessels accused of fishing disputed waters off the Kuril Islands and an Argentine
gunboat chasing and firing upon a Taiwanese vessel. Id.
6. See infra part IV.B.
7. U.N. GAOR, United Nations Convention on Straddling Stocks and Highly
Migratory Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A'CONF. 164133 (1995) [hereinafter Straddling
Stock Convention].
8. See infra part VI.
9. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened
for signature in 1982. On November 16, 1993, Guyana became the sixtieth nation to
ratify this Convention, enabling it to come into force twelve months later in accor-
dance with Article 308. See U.N. Chronicle, vol. 32, No. 1, at 8 (1995). If the history
of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is any indication,
the Straddling Stock Convention may not be ratified for years, if at all, making the
ICJ's ruling all the more imperative.
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dispute between coastal states and distant water nations. Part
VI previews the UN's Straddling Stock Convention's strategies
for the effective management of straddling stocks.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
A. Historical Perspective
The origins of the law of the sea date to the Roman Era
when the seas were considered communis omnium naturali jure
- common to all men by the operation of natural law.1" In the
seventeenth century, Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius advanced the
notion of freedom of the high seas to challenge a treaty which
divided the Atlantic between Spain and Portugal.11 Grotius ar-
gued that while nations could not claim property rights in the
high seas, they could claim territorial rights in the seas immedi-
ately adjacent to their shores.' Grotius carried the day; ocean
law has since emphasized freedom of the high seas while rele-
gating coastal states' jurisdiction to a narrow band of territorial
sea. 13
Although the territorial sea has since become an accepted
concept, initial international attempts to standardize its breadth
failed." The League of Nations Hague Conference in 1930, the
10. See Arvid Pardo, The Law of the Sea: Its Past and Its Future, 63 ORE. L.
REV. 7 (1984).
11. Id. at 8-9. The Treaty of Tordesillas, signed between Spain and Portugal,
demarcated the area west of the Cape Verde islands, granting Portugal the lands to
the east and Spain the lands to the west. The treaty language strongly implied that
each country owned the seas within its respective area. Id.
12. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 59 (1988). The concept
that a coastal state's rights extended to waters that could be protected from its
shore was known as the "cannonshot doctrine." Id. at 65.
13. Id. at 66.
Territorial Waters [seas] refers to all inland waters, all waters between
line of mean high tide and line of ordinary low water, and all waters
seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the coast
line .... That part of the sea adjacent to the coast of a given country
which is by international law deemed to be within the sovereignty of
that country, so that its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed
on those waters ....
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1473 (6th ed. 1990).
14. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 12, at 66 (explaining that several states
sought territorial seas of three and six miles, while Scandinavian states sought their
traditional four miles. Some states also sought the inclusion of a contiguous zone
adjacent to their territorial zone to enable them to exercise limited authority beyond
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First United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1958
(UNCLOS I), and the Second United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1960 (UNCLOS II), are all examples of failure
to standardize the territorial sea's width."5 In 1982, however,
the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III)16 codified limitations on the territorial sea.
7
Despite the failure of early international conventions to
reach agreement concerning the territorial sea's breadth, they
succeeded in other ways. At UNCLOS I, agreements on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 8 the High Seas, 9 High
Seas Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources,20 and the
Continental Shelf" adopted customary international ocean law
to govern the exploitation of ocean resources.22 Furthermore,
the Convention on High Seas Fishing and Conservation of Liv-
ing Resources recognized that the freedom of high seas fishing
could not be regulated or prohibited.23
Regional fishery organizations also developed to improve the
management and conservation of ocean resources.24 In 1949,
fishing nations founded the International Commission for North-
west Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF or Commission) to apply scien-
tific advancements to the conservation of fish stocks.25 The
their territorial sea).
15. Id. For an explanation of failures at UNCLOS II, see Arthur H. Dean, The
Second Geneva Conference, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1960).
16. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, U. N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. UNCLOS III,
Article 3 grants a twelve mile territorial sea. The more important issue addressed
by UNCLOS III was the development of the exclusive economic zone, addressed in
UNCLOS III, part V.
17. Id. art. 3; see CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 12, app. at 343. The width
of the territorial sea began to lose importance when most nations recognized a
twelve mile limit and the UNCLOS III adopted a 200 mile exclusive economic zone.
See also id. art. 57.
18. Convention on the Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606.
19. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312.
20. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138.
21. Convention of the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 138.
22. Jon L. Jacobson, International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, 45 LA. L.
REv. 1161, 1169 (1985).
23. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 19, at art. 2(2).
24. See KOERS, supra note 4, at 77-118 (listing the international fisheries orga-
nizations).
25. International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1 U.S.T. 478
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Commission, however, failed to resolve two of the most pressing
issues of high seas fisheries, territorial seas and coastal state
jurisdiction over fisheries.26 Although the Commission provided
a loose mechanism of management and enforcement, it ineffec-
tively regulated high seas fishing.27
B. Modern Law of the Sea: The Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization & The Third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
1. Creation of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
During the 1970s, coastal states began to expand their mari-
time jurisdiction in an attempt to protect diminishing fishery
resources.2' The formation of exclusive economic zones (EEZ)"9
altered the dynamics of regional fisheries organizations. 0 As a
(1949). Article VI details the Commission's responsibility for obtaining and collating
information necessary to maintain fish stocks in the Convention area and permits
the Commission to investigate, collect, analyze, study, hold hearings, conduct fishing
operations, publish and disseminate reports of findings. Article VIII grants the Com-
mission the authority to propose conservation measures over the Convention area by
establishing open and closed seasons, closing portions of the sub-areas, establishing
size limits, prohibiting fishing gear, and prescribing an overall catch limit for any
species of fish.
26. Id. art. 1, $ 2 states that "[niothing in this Convention shall be deemed to
affect adversely (prejudice) the claims of any Contracting Government in regard to
the limits of territorial waters or to the jurisdiction of a coastal state over fisheries."
27. See KOERS, supra note 4, at 94.
28. See CHURCHILL & LOwE, supra note 12, app. at 343 (listing nations that
claimed exclusive economic zones during the 1970s).
29. The origin of the EEZ is found in President Truman's proclamation of 1945.
See Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 1943-48 (1945).
[T]he Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish
conservation zones in those ares of the high seas contiguous to the coasts.
of the United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future
may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale. Where such
activities have been or shall hereafter be developed by its nationals
alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly
bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to
the regulation and control of the United States.
Id.
For the rationale behind the Truman Proclamation, see ANN L. HOOLICK,
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 45 (1981).
As a result of Truman's proclamation, Chile and Peru also claimed 200 mile
sovereign maritime zones off their coasts by presidential decree. For Chile, see Dec-
laration of President Gabriel Gonzales Videla, June 23, 1947. For Peru, see Supreme
Decree No. 781, Aug. 1, 1947 of President Jose Luis Bustameante y Rivero.
30. The EEZ impacted regional fisheries organizations in two distinct ways.
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result, members of ICNAF denounced their convention after
Canada claimed its EEZ.31 On January 1, 1979, fifteen nations
signed the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries32 to manage high seas fisheries
beyond Canada's EEZ.33 The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Or-
ganization (NAFO) intended to promote "the conservation and
optimum utilization of the fishery resources of the Northwest
Atlantic... and to encourage international cooperation and con-
sultation with respect to these resources. "34
In promoting optimum utilization of fishery resources,
NAFO considers the effect on stocks fished, the coastal state's
interest, and the interests of nations that have traditionally
fished the area.35 NAFO exists in a tenuous position because it
must balance both the competing interests of coastal states and
of distant water nations. In order to encourage compliance,
NAFO must strike a balance between too stringent regulations,
which would impede membership, and too relaxed regulations,
which would undermine conservation.
2. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) convened to
create an international norm for ocean law. UNCLOS III
changed existing customs of the sea by recognizing the coastal
First, regional organizations needed to regulate less area since coastal state jurisdic-
tion extended 200 miles into the sea. Second, UNCLOS III, Article 63 mandates that
regional organizations govern straddling stocks, providing these organizations with
unprecedented authority.
31. See J.E. Carroz, Institutional Aspects of Fishery Management Under the New
Regime of the Oceans, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 513, 519 (1984) (discussing the estab-
lishment of regional fishery commissions).
32. 1979 Can. T.S. No. 11 [hereinafter NAFO Convention]. Signatories included
Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, the European Union, Germany, Iceland, Japan,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.
Of this group only Canada, Denmark, the European Union (individual members:
France, Italy, Britain, Portugal, and Spain) Iceland, Norway, and the United States
were former Commission members.
33. Commission nations joined NAFO under the premise that regulatory man-
agement was necessary to conserve fishery resources. Additionally, UNCLOS III,
Article 63 requires regional organizations to regulate straddling stocks, providing na-
tions that are members of regional organizations more control of the regulatory
area's fisheries than non-member nations.
34. See NAFO Convention, supra note 32, pmbl. at 2.
35. See id. arts. 6, 7, and 11.
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state's claim to a 200 mile EEZ,3" proposing regional fisheries
organizations to manage resources,37 and creating a dispute
settlement mechanism to strengthen enforcement.38
UNCLOS III grants a coastal state the right to exploit, con-
serve, and manage the living and non-living resources of the
ocean and seabed 9 within that state's 200 mile EEZ.4 Coastal
states under UNCLOS III do not, however, have plenary author-
ity over their EEZ's resources. To prevent over-exploitation,
UNCLOS III encourages coastal states to cooperate with inter-
national organizations in managing and conserving the EEZ's
resources.41 In addition, coastal states must give "due regard to
the rights and duties of the other states."42 Coastal states are
therefore obligated to promote the EEZ's optimum utilization'
by giving other states access to any surplus resources." In ad-
dition, distant water nations are obliged to obey coastal state
laws when fishing within an EEZ. 5
UNCLOS III also encourages the conservation and manage-
ment of the high seas' living resources through regional fisheries
organizations." Specifically, UNCLOS III urges management of
stocks that straddle the EEZ and high seas by the regional orga-
nizations.47 By appointing regional organizations to manage
36. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, pt. V (covering the duties and obligations of
coastal states and of distant water nations with regard to exploitation of the EEZ's
resources).
37. Id. arts. 63, 118.
38. Id. pt. XV (detailing procedures for the settlement of disputes).
39. Id. art. 56, 1.
40. Id. art. 57.
41. Id. art. 61, 9 2 provides in part, "As appropriate, the coastal State and
competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall
co-operate to this end."
42. Id. art. 56, 2.
43. Id. art. 62, $ 2.
44. Id. This provision provides that "[t]he coastal State shall determine its
capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the
coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it
shall . ..give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch . . . ." Id.
(emphasis added). While UNCLOS III does not explicitly define "surplus," Article 63
indicates that a surplus is considered the difference between the coastal state's total
allowable catch and the amount it actually catches.
45. Id. art. 58. See also art. 62 (explaining the policies which should guide the
coastal state's exploitation of the living resources within its EEZ).
46. Id. art. 118.
47. See id. art. 63 (applicable to stocks occurring within the EEZs of two or
more coastal states or within both the EEZ and an area beyond and adjacent to it).
[Vol. 27:3560
1996] STRADDLING STOCKS
ocean resources, UNCLOS III shifts authority away from coastal
states to a more neutral policy maker. As members of the re-
gional organizations, coastal states and distant water nations
can work together in conserving the resources utilized by each.
Disputes arising under UNCLOS III" between states who
have ratified or acceded to the convention 49 are to be adjudicat-
ed by an agreed-upon tribunal.0 While UNCLOS III provides a
basic mechanism for resolving disputes, the participants must
first elect to utilize this option and abide by the tribunal's judg-
ment."1 This resolution mechanism departs significantly from
previous international conventions.52
III. CANADA AS A COASTAL STATE
Despite its rich fishery resources, Canada did not establish
a territorial sea until 19645 when it claimed a three mile sea
and an additional nine mile fishing zone.' Dissatisfied with the
protection this zone afforded its coastal resources, Canada ex-
tended its territorial sea to twelve miles and advanced its fish-
ing zone farther into the Atlantic.5 By 1975, Canada, like
48. Id. art. 286.
[Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Conven-
tion shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1
(which details the general provisions of settlements of disputes), be sub-
mitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal
having jurisdiction under this section.
Id.
49. Id. art. 287, T 1.
50. Id. The Article provides:
the following [are] means for the settlement of disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of UNCLOS III:
a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accor-
dance with Annex VI;
b) the International Court of Justice;
c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII
for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
Id.
51. See Roberto Ago, "Binding" Advisory Opinions of the International Court of
Justice, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 439 (1991) (criticizing the ICJ's advisory opinions).
52. See generally UNCLOS I, supra notes 17-20.
53. S.C. 1964, c. 22, pt. 1, T 3, § 1. For a general history of Canada's devel-
opment as a coastal State and its role in the Law of the Sea, see WILMA BROEREN,
CANADA'S ROLE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 1927 TO 1975 (1977).
54. S.C. 1964, c. 22, pt. 1, 9 4, §§ 1, 2.
55. S.C. 1970, c. 68, § 3, subsec. 1. See also Parzival Copes, Canadian Fisheries
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many nations, felt an increasing necessity to protect coastal re-
sources threatened by fishing fleets from distant water na-
tions.5" Canada responded in 1977 by again extending its mari-
time jurisdiction, claiming a 200 mile EEZ.
Canada's fisheries management also changed as a result of
its new EEZ. In accord with international obligations,57 Canada
granted distant water nations' fleets quotas of under-utilized
fish stocks within its EEZ.5s In exchange, Canada expected
"commensurate benefits," such as distant water nations use of
Canadian processing plants and ports. 9 Canada also embarked
upon an expansionist national fishing policy.6" Licensing of At-
lantic fishermen increased forty-five percent between 1974 and
198161 and processing facilities expanded by thirty-five percent
between 1977 and 1981.62 Furthermore, annual groundfish har-
vest within the EEZ leapt from 470,000 tons in 1976 to 779,000
tons in 1981.63 Canada's expansive fisheries policy depended
upon maximum production to sustain its growth and combat
market downturns.6" Such a policy could not exist indefinitely.
Management Policies, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY 3, 4 (Donald McRae & Gordon
Munro eds., 1989).
56. See Copes, supra note 55, at 4. See also MICHAEL J. KIRBY, TASK FORCE ON
ATLANTIC FISHERIES, NAVIGATING TROUBLED WATERS: A NEW POLICY FOR THE ATLAN-
TIC FISHERIES 16-18 (1982) [hereinafter KIRBY REPORT].
57. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 62.
58. See Copes, supra note 55, at 8.
59. Id. The benefits Canada sought included access to Canadian fish products
in foreign markets; processing in Canadian shore plants of all or part of the catch
taken by foreign vessels; over-the-side sales of fish caught by fishermen to foreign
factory vessels; fishing on contract by Canadian boats for delivery to foreign factory
vessels; increased use of Canadian ports, ship repair facilities and chandlery services
by foreign vessels; continuing abstention from high seas fishing for Canadian salmon;
recognition of Canadian leadership in NAFO, relating to Canada's special interest in
stocks adjacent to Canada's 200-mile EEZ; and acquisition of new technology by
Canadian fishing companies through "development charters" engaging foreign vessels.
Id. at 8.
See J.W.C. Tomilson & P.C. Brown, Joint Ventures With Foreigners as a
Method of Exploiting Canadian Fishery Resources Under Extended Fisheries Juris-
diction, 5 OCEAN MGMT. 251 (1979).
60. See KIRBY REPORT, supra note 56, 19-21.
61. Id. at 31 (stating that the number of licensed, though not necessarily ac-
tive, fishermen in the Atlantic as a whole increased from about 36,500 to 53,500
between 1974 and 1981).
62. Id. (stating that processing facilities increased from 519 to 700 between
1977 and 1981).
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 32. See also Copes, supra note 55, at 7 (explaining the two main
reasons for Canada's expansion of its fishing operations to maximum capacity. First,
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The Canadian government commissioned a task force to
identify developing problems in its rapidly expanding Atlantic
fishing industry and to create a viable plan to manage its At-
lantic fisheries. 5 The task force issued a report identifying sev-
eral issues presenting particular difficulties in the effective man-
agement of Canadian Atlantic fisheries.6" According to the task
force, the most fundamental problem of fisheries management
stemmed from the "common property"67 nature of fish stocks,6
which leads coastal communities to view fishing as a right, not a
privilege. As a result, fishermen compete for a maximum share
of the resource before quotas are fulfilled.69 Such intense exploi-
tation, however, ultimately leads to diminished resources and
lower incomes for fishermen.7 ° To combat these problems, the
task force specified three major objectives71 and several minor
recommendations to remove the impediments to effective man-
agement and conservation.72
the Canadian government recognized a dire need for additional employment opportu-
nities in the depressed coastal communities of Atlantic Canada. Second, the govern-
ment wanted to demonstrate solidarity with the fishing industry in its anger and
frustration over past depredations by foreign fishing fleets, and to reserve Canadian
fish stocks for Canadian fishermen to the fullest extent possible).
65. See generally KIRBY REPORT, supra note 56.
66. See id. at 197-344 (noting the impediments included international issues,
the harvesting sector, resource-short plants, utilization of northern cod stock, the
northern fisheries, quality, the port market, improving fish plant profitability, mar-
keting, fishermen's incomes, financial assistance, the herring seine fleet, and dealing
with differing views).
67. Id. at 211-13. "Common property" means that the resource is common to all
and therefore cannot be owned by anyone. Id.
68. Id. at 211.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 185-194. Major objectives include the following: 1) the Atlantic fishing
industry should be economically viable on an ongoing basis, where being viable im-
plies an ability to survive downturns with only a normal business failure rate and
without government assistance; 2) employment in the Atlantic fishing industry
should be maximized subject to the constraint that those employed receive a reason-
able income as a result of fishery-related activities, including fishery-related income
transfer payments; 3) fish within the 200 mile Canadian EEZ should be harvested
and processed by Canadians in firms owned by Canadians wherever this is consis-
tent with objectives 1 and 2 and with Canada's international treaty obligations.
72. Id. at 197-344 (including issues and recommendations on international is-
sues, the harvesting sector, resource-short plants, utilization of northern cod stock,
the northern fisheries, quality, the port market, improving fish plant profitability,
marketing, fisherman's incomes, financial assistance, the herring seine fleet, dealing
with differing views, and consultation and decision-making processes).
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Despite these recommendations, Canada's Atlantic fisheries
took a turn for the worse in recent years. In early 1992, Canada
cut its annual northern cod quota within its EEZ from a mid-
1980s level of 265,000 tons to only 120,000 tons in an attempt to
save dwindling stocks.73 Shortly thereafter, the Canadian De-
partment of Fisheries and Oceans imposed a two year moratori-
um on northern cod fishing.74 Canada also urged NAFO to ban
northern cod fishing for 199471 in the NAFO Regulatory Area
(NRA).76 In an attempt to further improve conservation, Cana-
da amended its Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, enabling Cana-
da to inspect 77 and seize78 vessels fishing within the NRA.79
73. Julian Beltrame, Polite, Diplomatic meeting brings no resolution to Cod
Fishing, MONTREAL GAZ., Apr. 24, 1992, at B1.
74. Canada Bans Northern Cod Fishing for Two Years, UPI, July 2, 1992, In-
ternational Section. At printing the moratorium is still effective.
75. NORTH ATL. FISHERIES ORG. NEws, No. 1, at 3 (1994). NAFO has also
banned fishing of the following species in parts of the Convention area: American
plaice, yellowtail flounder, witch flounder, and capelin. Id.
76. See NAFO Convention, supra note 32, art. 1, 2. "[T]he area referred to in
this Convention as 'the Regulatory Area' is that part of the Convention Area which
lies beyond the areas in which coastal States exercised fisheries jurisdiction." Id.
Article 1, 91 1 provides:
The area to which this Convention applies, hereinafter referred to as "the
Convention Area", shall be the waters of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean
north of 35' north latitude and west of a line extending due north from
35 0' north latitude and 42" west longitude to 59"' latitude, thence due
west to 44' west longitude, and thence due north to the coast of
Greenland, and the waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Davis Strait and
Baffin Bay south of 78 °' north latitude.
Id.
See infra part VIII.
77. Bill C-29, An Act to amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, as passed
by the House of Commons May 11, 1994, 128 C. Gaz. No. 12, pt. 12 2222-227 (June
15, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1383 (1994). Section 7 provides:
A protection officer may a) for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
this Act and the regulations, board and inspect any fishing vessel found
within Canadian fisheries waters or the NAFO Regulatory Area; and b)
with a warrant issued under section 7.1, search any fishing vessel found
within Canadian fisheries waters or the NAFO regulatory Area and its
cargo.
Id.
78. The seizure section was part of the original Fisheries Protection Act but
was limited to Canada's EEZ. See Ch. C-33, § 9, providing,
Where a protection officer suspects on reasonable grounds that an offence
under this Act has been committed, the officer may seize:
a) any fishing vessel by means of or in relation to which the officer be-
lieves on reasonable grounds the offence was committed;
b) any goods aboard a fishing vessel described in paragraph (a), including
fish, tackle, rigging, apparel, furniture, stores and cargo; or
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Based upon Canada's special interest as a coastal state, the
amendment subjected the "nose" and "tail""0 of the Grand
Banks to Canadian jurisdiction and banned certain nations from
fishing the NRA. 81 Canada also filed a reservation with the
ICJ, asserting that Canada's domestic law applied to the high
seas Grand Banks and denying the ICJ jurisdiction over matters
arising under the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act.82
c) any fishing vessel described in paragraph (a) and any of the goods de-
scribed in paragraph (b).
Id.
The amendment of May 11, 1994, infra note 79, extended the Fisheries Pro-
tection Act to the high seas portions of the Grand Banks.
79. Bill C-29, An Act to amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, as passed
by the House of Commons May 11, 1994, § 5.1, which provides:
Parliament, recognizing
a) that straddling stocks on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland are a
major renewable world food source having provided a livelihood for centu-
ries to fishers,
b) that those stocks are threatened with extinction,
c) that there is an urgent need for all fishing vessels to comply in both
Canadian fisheries waters and the NAFO Regulatory Area with sound
conservation and management measures for those stocks, notably those
measures that are taken under the Convention on Future Multilateral
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done at Ottawa on Octo-
ber 24, 1978, Canada Treaty Series 1979 No. 11, and
d) that some foreign fishing vessels continue to fish for those stocks in
the NAFO Regulatory Area in a manner that undermines the effective-
ness of sound and management measures.
Id.
See also id. § 5.2 provides: "No person, being aboard a foreign fishing vessel
of a prescribed class, shall, in the NAFO Regulatory Area, fish or prepare to fish for
a straddling stock in contravention of any of the prescribed conservation and man-
agement measures." Id.
80. See infra part VIII for location of the Grand Banks' "nose" and "tail."
81. Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, § 21(2) provides:
For the purposes of section 5.2 of the Act:
(b) the following classes of foreign fishing vessels are prescribed classes,
namely:
(i) foreign fishing vessels without nationality,
(ii) foreign fishing vessels that fly the flag of any state set out in
Table III to this section, and
(c) in respect of a foreign fishing vessel of a class prescribed by subpara-
graph (b)(i) or (ii), prohibitions against fishing for the straddling stocks
set out in Table I or II to this section, preparing to fish for those
straddling stocks and catching and retaining those straddling stocks are
prescribed conservation and management measures; and Table I includes
straddling stocks located in division 3-L, 3-N or 3-0 Table II includes
straddling stocks located in division 3-M, solely Greenland Halibut Table
III includes: Belize, Cayman Islands, Honduras, Panama, Saint-Vincent
and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone.
Id.
82. 93-94 I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. 10, p. 88 (1994) [hereinafter Canada's Reserva-
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IV. CANADIAN AND SPANISH CONFLICT
AND RESOLUTION OF 1995
A. Conflict
As Canada intensified conservation measures within its
EEZ, it also advocated improved management efforts in the
NRA. 3 On Canada's urging, NAFO's Fisheries Commission de-
creased the NRA's Greenland halibut quota from 60,000 to
27,000 tons for 19 9 5 . 4 Because NAFO considers both a memb-
er's historical dependance on fishing the NRA85 and its most
recent quota level in setting a quota allocation, the European
Union (EU) expected to obtain a substantial percentage of
NAFO's Greenland halibut allocation." Previously, the EU had
received seventy-five percent of NAFO's Greenland halibut quo-
ta. 7 The Fisheries Commission, however, awarded the EU only
about twelve percent or 3,400 tons of the total allowable catch,
while providing Canada with nearly sixty percent, or 16,300
tons."5
Dismayed by the quota allocation, the EU invoked a proce-
dural objection which suspended the allocation formula but
maintained the ceiling of 27,000 tons. 9 Shortly after the EU's
tion].
83. NORTH ATL. FISHERIES ORG., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, STATEMENT BY CANADI-
AN REPRESENTATIVE ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 89, annex 3.
84. NORTH ATL. FISHERIES ORG. NEWS, No. 2, at 2 (1995).
85. NAFO Convention, supra note 32, art. XI, T 4 states:
Proposals adopted by the Commission for the allocation of catches in the
Regulatory Area shall take into account the interests of Commission
members whose vessels have traditionally fished within that Area, and in
the allocation of catches on the Grand Banks and Flemish Cap, Commis-
sion members shall give special consideration to the Contracting Party
whose coastal communities are primarily dependent on fishing for stocks
related to these fishing banks ....
Id.
86. Defiant Bonino Vows to Block NAFO Turbot (Greenland halibut) Decision,
EUR. REP., Feb. 22, 1995, § 2018.
87. Id.
88. NORTH ATL. FISHERIES ORG. NEWS, No. 2, at 2 (1995) (explaining that
member nations on the NAFO Fisheries Commission voted to distribute the 27,000
ton Greenland halibut quota as follows: Canada 16,300, European Union 3,400, Rus-
sia 3,200, Japan 2,600 and the remaining member nations 1,500 tons).
89. See NAFO Convention, supra note 32, art. XII, 9 1, 3, providing that,
If any Commission member presents to the Executive Secretary an ob-
jection to a proposal within sixty days of the date of transmittal specified
1996] STRADDLING STOCKS 567
objection, Canada declared a sixty day moratorium on Greenland
halibut for EU vessels in the NRA, specifically on the high seas
portion of the Grand Banks.90 When the EU disobeyed
Canada's NRA moratorium, Canada added Spain and Portu-
gal9 to the list of nations it had banned from fishing the high
seas Grand Banks.92 Several days later, Canada chased and
in the notification of the proposal by the Executive Secretary, the propos-
al shall not become a binding measure until the expiration of forty days
following the date of transmittal specified in the notification of that ob-
jection to the Contracting Parties. Thereupon any other Commission
member may similarly object prior to the expiration of the additional
forty-day period, or within thirty days after the date of transmittal speci-
fied in the notification of the Contracting parties of any objection present-
ed within that additional forty-day period, whichever shall be the later.
The proposal shall then become a measure binding on all Contracting
Parties, except those which have presented objections, at the end of the
extended period or periods for objecting. If, however, at the end of such
extended period or periods, objections have been presented and main-
tained by a majority of Commission members, the proposal shall not
become a binding measure, unless any or all of the Commission members
nevertheless agree as among themselves to be bound by it on an agreed
date.
Id.
90. Robert Kozak, Canada Seizes Spanish Fishing Ship on High Sea, REUTERS,
Mar. 10, 1995.
91. Canada has viewed Spain and Portugal as major offenders of international
fishing agreements. See Robert Applebaum, Straddling Stocks - International Law
and the Northwest Atlantic Problem, in CANADIAN BULLETIN OF FISHERIES AND
AQUATIC SCIENCES, PERSPECTIVES ON CANADIAN MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
193-210, 194, 196 (L.S. Parsons & W.H. Lear eds., 1993) (arguing that while Spain
had traditionally fished the Northwest Atlantic, it did not join NAFO upon its for-
mation. Instead, Spain heavily fished the area outside the NAFO conservation frame-
work, targeting cod, and fishing at a level higher than that set aside for Spain by
NAFO. In addition, once Spain joined NAFO, it began to fish stocks above levels set
by NAFO. When Spain and Portugal joined the European Community (EC), the EC
adopted a noticeably more conservative position at NAFO meetings, which Canada
blamed on Spain and Portugal's membership). Id.
92. CANADA GAZ., pt. I, vol. 129, No. 6, at 653 provides:
The primary threat to the recovery of the Greenland halibut stocks is,
accordingly, posed by vessels of Spain and Portugal which will, unless
stopped fish significantly over the EU quota of 3,400t. As an additional
and significant problem, Spanish and Portuguese vessels have, starting in
1994, significantly increased the rate at which they are violating NAFO
regulations, in particular regarding the recording of catch and minimum
mesh sizes. Continuation of these violations will lead to under-reporting
of catches of Greenland halibut and high catches of juveniles, further
exacerbating the over fishing of the stock, and will cause the same prob-
lem for other stocks.
These amendments to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Regula-
tions:
(a) add vessels of Spain and Portugal as a class of foreign fishing vessel
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fired upon a Spanish vessel fishing the NRA,93 eventually tow-
ing it back to a Canadian port where investigation revealed that
the vessel held catches of immature Greenland halibut, used
illegal fishing nets, and contained twenty-five tons of American
plaice" - also under a NAFO moratorium.95 Canada based its
actions upon the 1994 amendment to its Coastal Fisheries Pro-
tection Act.9"
Canada asserted that, as a coastal state, it possessed a
special interest in preserving fish stocks straddling its EEZ.
Because the "nose" and "tail" of the Grand Banks extend beyond
Canada's EEZ, the quantity of fish taken on the "nose" and "tail"
diminishes the quantity of fish within Canada's EEZ.97 As a
result, fish stocks allocated to Canada as a coastal state may be
plundered by distant water nations fishing the high seas. Cana-
da cited limitations on high seas fishing under UNCLOS III.
UNCLOS III, Article 116 addresses straddling stocks, providing
that "[a]ll States have the right for their nationals to engage in
fishing on the high seas subject to: a) their treaty obligations; b)
the rights and duties as well as the interests of the Coastal
States provided in Article 63.2"' Freedom of the seas, Canada
argued, does not afford distant water nations a carte blanche to
that is subject to the prohibition section 5.2 of the Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act on fishing for listed straddling stocks in the NAFO Regu-




94. Canada Cites New Evidence of Illegal Fishing, REUTERS, Mar. 15 (1995).
95. NORTH ATL. FISHERIES ORG. NEWS, No. 1, at 4 (1994) (identifying the five
major stocks under a fishing moratorium in portions of the NRA. These include cod,
American plaice, yellowtail flounder, witch flounder, and capelin).
96. See Kozak, supra note 90; see also Bill C-29, Act to amend the Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act, supra note 79.
97. Donald M. McRae, Approaches to the Resolution of Atlantic and Pacific
Ocean Problems, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 241 (1989); see William T. Burke, Fishing in
the Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New International Law of Fisheries,
16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1989) (explaining the conflict between coastal state and dis-
tant water nations regarding high seas fishing).
98. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 87, S 2, providing that, "[these free-
doms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other
States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard
for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area."
99. See id. art. 116 (emphasis added). Article 117 provides "[a]ll States have
the duty to take, or to co-operate with other States in taking, such measures for
their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas."
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fish straddling stocks.
Spain adamantly contested Canada's unilateral extension of
its jurisdiction to the high seas.'00 Spain argued that such an
extension violated UNCLOS III Article 89 which provides that
"no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high
seas to its sovereignty." 1 In addition, Spain claimed that
Canada's ban on fishing Greenland halibut on the high seas
violated customary international law which permits all states
equal rights of access to high seas fishery resources.0  Spain
also argued that Canada's high seas seizure violated Spain's
right as a flag state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its
high seas vessels.' 3 While admitting that international law
sometimes permits seizure of foreign vessels on the high seas,
Spain argued that this instance did not satisfy those excep-
tions.'"4 Canada should have sought and received Spain's con-
100. Commission Calls on Canada to Negotiate in Good Faith, RAPID, Mar. 30,
1995.
101. Id. See also UNCLOS III, supra note 16. UNCLOS III, Article 87 provides:
the high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, in-
ter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: . . . e) freedom of fish-
ing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2 ...
Id.
Section 2, Article 119 pertinently provides "States concerned shall ensure that
conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in
fact against the fishermen of any State." Id. Conservation and Management of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, UNCLOS III, sec. 2, art. 119, 9 3.
102. Commission Calls on Canada to Negotiate in Good Faith, supra note 100;
see UNCLOS III, supra note 16, arts. 87, 116.
103. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 92, T 1 provides in part, "[sihips shall sail
under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided
for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subjected to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas."
104. Id. art. 110. This Article grants the right to visit a high sea vessel:
Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty,
a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a
ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 (Immu-
nity of warships on the high seas) and 96 (Immunity of ships used only
on government non-commercial service), is not justified in boarding it un-
less there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag
State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109 (Unautho-
rized broadcasting from the high seas);
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the
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sent before boarding its vessel. Spain also argued that Canada
failed to abide by its obligation to cooperate with regard to
straddling stocks. 105
Although Canada released the Spanish fishing vessel short-
ly after the seizure,"' Spain, contesting Canada's extension of
its coastal state jurisdiction into the high seas, filed a complaint
with the ICJ,10 7 currently pending before the ICJ.'0°
B. Agreement Under the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization
Canada and the EU resolved their dispute on April 16,
1995.' While the agreement does not address Canada's exten-
sion of its coastal state jurisdiction into the Grand Banks high
seas, it reaffirms the parties' "commitment to enhanced co-opera-
tion in the conservation and rational management of fish
stocks"'10 and requires Canada to repeal its March 3, 1995 act
prohibiting Spain and Portugal from fishing the Grand
Banks."' The agreement upholds the 27,000 ton Greenland
halibut allocation and ensures a ratio of ten to three in favor of
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.Id. z
105. See id. art. 63, T 2.
106. Canada Cites New Evidence of Illegal Fishing, REUTERS, Mar. 15, (1995).
107. Spain brings a case against Canada (Spain v. Can.) 1995 I.C.J. Pleadings
No. 95/8 (Mar. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Spanish Complaint].
108. See infra part V.
109. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Agreement (Can.- EU) Apr. 16,
1995, A(1) [hereinafter NAFO Agreement].
110. Id.
111. Id. at C(1). See CANADA GAZ., pt. II, vol. 129, No. 10 (description). The de-
scription provides:
By this amendment to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Regula-
tions, the vessels of Spain and Portugal will no longer be included in any
of the classes of foreign fishing vessels to which specific protection and
conservation measures apply with respect to fishing for straddling stocks
in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) Regulatory Area
outside Canada's 200-mile zone.
On April 20, 1995, Canada and the European Union (EU) resolved
their dispute regarding effective control of Spanish and Portuguese ves-
sels fishing for Greenland halibut and other listed straddling stocks in
the NAFO Regulatory Area. Canada can now remove the fishing vessels
of Spain and Portugal from the class of foreign vessels in which they
were listed.
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the EU and Canada for future Greenland halibut quotas."m It
also focuses primarily upon improved control and enforcement of
NAFO fisheries through inspections, elaborating major infringe-
ments and vessel observers for the NRA."' At NAFO's annual
meeting in September 1995, members adopted the Canada and
EU Agreement as a NAFO regulation, effective January 1,
1996. '
The agreement targets standard inspection procedures and
increases the presence of inspectors in an attempt to improve
compliance with NAFO regulations." Under the agreement,
when inspectors suspect illegal activity, they must not unduly
hinder fishing vessels' but should instead swiftly contact the
flag state and NAFO's Executive Secretary."7 In addition,
members' vessels fishing stocks under NAFO regulations"'
must undergo dockside inspection at each port of call"9 and
must report catches of Greenland halibut to NAFO within forty-
eight hours.
20
The agreement delineates major infractions, such as the
refusal to cooperate with inspectors, misreporting catches, mesh-
size violations, hail system violations, and interference with the
satellite tracking system.' The agreement also creates proce-
dures for citing violators. If NAFO inspectors cite a vessel for
commission of a major infringement, the flag state shall inspect
the vessel within forty-eight hours. 22 NAFO inspectors must
112. Id. annex II.
113. See generally NAFO Agreement, supra note 109, annex 1, § II(1) Inspec-
tions, 11(9) Major Infringements, II(11) Pilot Project for Observers and Satellite
Tracking.
114. NAFO Press Release, 17th Annual Meeting of NAFO, at 11-15, Sept. 1995.
115. See NAFO Agreement, supra note 109, annex I, § II(1)-(4) for standards of
inspection procedure.
116. Id. annex I, § 11(1). See also id. annex 1, § 11(3) (detailing the method
outlined for increased inspection presence).
117. Id. annex I, § 11(2).
118. NORTH ATL. FISHERIES ORG. INFORMATION BOOKLET (1993), at 14 (identify-
ing the ten major species of the NAFO Convention Area as: cod, herring, redfish,
capelin, silver hake, mackerel, pollock, American plaice, greenland halibut, haddock).
Id. (published with permission). See NAFO Agreement, supra note 109, art. 1, § 4,
excluding certain species from NAFO regulations.
119. Id. annex I, § 11(7).
120. Id. annex 1, § 11(8).
121. Id. annex I, § II(9)(a)-(e).
122. Id. annex 1, § II(9)(i).
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report the infringement to NAFO's Executive Secretary' and
may take the necessary means to secure evidence.12 Because
flag states prosecute their own vessels violating international
law, 2 ' the agreement improves NAFO's case monitoring by re-
quiring member nations to make semi-annual reports to NAFO's
Executive Secretary on the status of each proceeding,'28 thus,
ensuring that penalties provide an effective deterrent.2 7
Furthermore, the agreement creates a pilot project for ob-
servers and a satellite tracking system.'28 Each contracting
party" is required to place an independent and impartial ob-
server on each vessel operating within the NRA to monitor the
vessel's compliance with NAFO's conservation and enforcement
measures. 3 ° As a result, all vessels fishing the NRA will have
observers on board, providing a framework for stricter compli-
ance with NAFO regulations. In addition, contracting parties
will equip thirty-five percent of their vessels fishing the NRA
with an autonomous satellite system to enable all contracting
parties to track vessels fishing the regulatory area.'3 '
Although the agreement enhances NAFO's enforcement
mechanism, it fails to address the crux of the dispute -
Canada's assertion that, as a coastal state, it possesses special
interests in managing straddling stocks and may exercise extra-
jurisdictional authority to protect those stocks in the Grand
Banks' "nose" and "tail." In fact, the agreement declares that the
parties "maintain their respective positions on the Conformity of
the Amendment of 25 May, 1994 to Canada's Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act."'32 Canada still maintains its special interest,
and Spain has not withdrawn its complaint before the ICJ.'33
123. Id. annex I, § II(9)(iii).
124. Id. annex I, § II(9)(i).
125. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 92, § 1.
126. See NAFO Agreement, supra note 109, annex I, § 11(10).
127. Id. annex I, § II(10), T 2. Such penalties may include suspension or with-
drawal of permission to fish the NRA. Id.
128. Id. annex I, § II(11)(a), (b).
129. A "contracting party" is a nation which has assented to the NAFO Conven-
tion.
130. NAFO Agreement, supra note 109, at annex I, § II(11)(a)(1)-(2).
131. Id. at annex I, § II(11)(b)(1).
132. See id. Agreed Minute, art. D, § 1.
133. See Canada's Reservation, supra note 82.
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
A. Jurisdictional Issue
The threshold issue is whether the ICJ has jurisdiction over
the dispute.13' Jurisdictional questions usually concern wheth-
er the parties are under an obligation to accept the ICJ's judg-
ment," whether the case comes within the scope of the con-
sent given by the parties for the ICJ to exercise jurisdiction,
1 3 1
or whether the ICJ should refrain from exercising jurisdic-
tion.
13
The ICJ has only a "consensual basis of jurisdiction," as it is
always contingent upon the parties' consent." Both Canada
and Spain acceded to UNCLOS III,131 thereby agreeing to sub-
mit disputes to the appropriate tribunal" and providing the
ICJ with consensual jurisdiction.' In addition, UNCLOS III,
Article 288 provides that the ICJ "shall have jurisdiction over
any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with this
Part."' Because the dispute hinges on interpreting states'
134. 1 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
99 (1965).
Where the Court declines to decide the merits of a contentious case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction .. . it declares that the law between
the parties does not include the obligation to submit the concrete dispute
to the decision of the Court. This does not necessarily mean, however,
that the dispute is not governed by international law.
Id.
135. Id. at 303.
136. Id. at 304.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Canada signed UNCLOS III on Dec. 31, 1994; Spain signed UNCLOS III on
Dec. 4, 1984. See Multilateral Treaties St/leg/ser.e/13.
140. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, pt. XV, § 2, art. 286, providing that,
"[slubject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section
1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal
having jurisdiction under this section." Id.
141. Id. art. 287 provides in part:
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declara-
tion, one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention:
(b) the International Court of Justice .. .
Id.
142. Id. art. 288, T 1. "A Court or tribunal referred to in article 287 [see supra
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rights under Article 116, the case comes within the scope of the
ICJ's jurisdiction pursuant to Article 288."
The primary impediment to the ICJ exercising jurisdiction
is Canada's reservation, which denies international tribunals
jurisdiction over Canadian actions taken on the high seas Grand
Banks and imposes the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as the
governing law.1" However, "even if a matter in principle comes
within domestic jurisdiction, where an international treaty is
relevant to the discussion, that treaty will involve recourse to
international law, and hence exclude the application of the ex-
ception."" The ICJ should, therefore, disregard Canada's res-
ervation and claim jurisdiction over the dispute.
B. Legal Considerations
Because the ICJ will likely claim jurisdiction, this Comment
will next analyze the primary issues for resolution. Although
stare decisis does not guide the ICJ, the Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion case between Iceland and the United Kingdom (UK)47
may provide an appropriate context for analyzing the Canada-
Spain dispute.
1. The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
In 1961, the UK and Iceland agreed upon an Exchange of
Notes in which the UK acquiesced to the creation of a twelve
mile Icelandic fishery zone while Iceland worked to extend its
fishery jurisdiction. Once completed, Iceland would give the UK
six months notice prior to implementing its new fishery jurisdic-
note 141] shall also have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation
or application of an international agreement related to the purpose of this Conven-
tion, which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement." Id.
This means that future disputes concerning the Straddling Stock Convention
will also come under the jurisdiction of international tribunals and courts as an
extension of UNCLOS III.
143. Id.
144. See Canada's Reservation, supra note 82.
145. See ROSENNE, supra note 134, at 395. See also Spanish Complaint, supra
note 107.
146. See Note, Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era: The Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 83 MICH. L. REv. 597, n.72 (1984).
147. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3.
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tion.' " The Note also provided for the ICJ to resolve any dis-
pute concerning Iceland's extended jurisdiction. In early 1971,
Iceland terminated the fishery jurisdiction agreement with the
UK and announced plans to extend its exclusive fishery jurisdic-
tion.149 The UK disputed Iceland's actions and appealed to the
ICJ for resolution.' In July 1971, however, Iceland extended
its fishery jurisdiction fifty miles and prohibited all foreign ves-
sels from the zone.1
5
1
In deciding the case, the ICJ recognized two governing prin-
ciples of international law, both established at UNCLOS II.
First, coastal states could claim exclusive fisheries jurisdictions
beyond their territorial seas."2 Second, in situations where a
coastal state was exceptionally dependent upon its fisheries,
that state possessed preferential fishing rights in waters adja-
cent to its exclusive fishing zone.'" The ICJ, however, nar-
rowed the scope in which coastal states could invoke their pref-
erential fishing rights, noting that coastal states may exercise
their preferential rights only when extensive exploitation re-
quired intervention.' In addition, the ICJ stated that coastal
states could not unilaterally determine the extent of their pref-
erential rights by eclipsing other states' rights' but must also
consider the other states' historical dependence on the fishery
zone. '5 Finally, coastal states' preferential rights are based
upon the extent of their dependence on adjacent waters, and
fluctuate as that dependence changes.5 7
2. UNCLOS III
With the inception of UNCLOS III, the law of the sea has
changed dramatically from the time of the Fisheries Jurisdiction
148. 28 I.C.J.Y.B. 109, 111 (1973-74).
149. Id. at 112.
150. Id. The UK argued that "the Exchange of Notes was not open to unilateral
denunciation and that in its view the measure contemplated 'would have no basis in
international law.' Id.
151. Id.
152. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 23, 9 52. This principle
evolved into the 200 mile EEZ; see UNCLOS HII, supra note 16, art. 57.
153. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 23 52.
154. Id. at 24, 60.
155. Id. at 30-31, 9 71.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 30, T 70.
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decision. Subsequent to that decision and prior to UNCLOS III,
coastal states enjoyed expansion of their fishing zones."s To-
day, by contrast, international law confines coastal states' fish-
ing zones to 200 miles.159 The trend under UNCLOS III is not
expansion of coastal state jurisdiction, but rather preservation of
the current limit."16 In addition, UNCLOS III enumerates
coastal states' and distant water nations' rights and obligations
concerning high seas fishing. 1 '
While Article 116 grants coastal states special interests in
high seas fishing, it is too vague to provide adequate guid-
ance." 2 It does not explicitly grant coastal states the right to
regulate adjacent seas fishing. Instead, it apparently obliges
distant water nations to restrict their fishing in consideration of
coastal states' fishing policies. In addition, Article 63, paragraph
2, urges coastal states and distant water nations that fish strad-
dling stocks to agree upon conservation measures for those
stocks on the adjacent seas." In further defining the duties
and obligations created under these articles, the ICJ should
consider the principles applied in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case
and contemporary international law.
3. New Test
The threshold issue in settling disputes concerning strad-
dling stocks should be whether the offending distant water na-
tion is a member of the regional fishing organization. If the
158. See CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 12, app. at 343.
159. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 57.
160. States advocating the "Presential Sea" doctrine reserve the high seas for
their own economic and scientific needs. Those Pacific South American nations that
spawned the exclusive economic zone (see supra note 29) have recently advanced
this expansionist doctrine, threatening a stable ocean law regime. Alison Rieser,
ASIL Observer Comments on UN Conference on Straddling and Migratory Fish Stock,
ASIL NEWSLETrER, Nov. 1993. See also Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Towards an Effec-
tive Management of High Seas Fisheries and the Settlement of the Pending Issues of
the Law of the Sea, delivered at the 23rd Annual Law of the Sea Institute at Gen-
oa, Italy, June 24, 1992, at 415, 427-29. However, The Straddling Stock Convention
effectively eviscerates the concept of the "Presential Sea" by mandating that high
seas fishing nations abide with the regional organization's regulations. Therefore,
coastal states do not need to expand their jurisdictions because regulatory organiza-
tions will conserve ocean resources.
161. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, arts. 87, 147, 166.
162. Id. art. 116.
163. Id. art. 63, $ 2.
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offending nation is a member, then the regional organization's
regulations should govern enforcement within the regulatory
area pursuant to UNCLOS III, Article 63, paragraph 2.'" As a
member of the regional organization, the coastal state should
enforce the regional organization's regulations, but should not
apply its domestic law to the regulatory area. Instead, the re-
gional organization's seniority in the regulatory area should be
affirmed and buttressed by ICJ rulings for two reasons. First,
UNCLOS III specifically directs regional organizations to govern
straddling stock issues." The ICJ's ruling, therefore, should
be framed by the UN's intent concerning the structure of the re-
gional organization's regulatory authority. Furthermore, the
ICJ will strengthen the regional organization's authority over
the regulatory area by upholding UNCLOS III provisions dele-
gating governing power to regional organizations. Second, na-
tions that have become NAFO members have voluntarily assent-
ed to the NAFO Convention which grants NAFO, not individual
states, authority to govern the regulatory area. To permit coast-
al states' regulatory authority over NAFO members on adjacent
high seas would penalize nations which have complied with
international law.' Furthermore, a policy distinguishing be-
tween nations that comply with international law and those that
do not will have the greatest impact in forcing independent
distant water nations (IDWN)'67 to join the regional organiza-
tion.
If, by contrast, a nation fishing the adjacent high seas is not
a member of the regional organization, the IDWN should then
be presumed to practice unreasonable fishing procedures within
the regulatory area. This presumption is based upon the fact
that international law mandates nations that fish straddling
stocks to either enter the regional organization or create a bilat-
eral agreement with the coastal state whose adjacent high seas
are fished." A nation failing to fulfill either of these require-




167. An independent distant water nation is a distant water nation that has not
joined the regional organization. Therefore, it is not a contracting party that has
assented to the regional organization's governing authority. See NAFO Convention,
supra note 32, for use of term "contracting party."
168. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 63, 1 2.
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the regional organization's regulations. Such a presumption of
unreasonable fishing practice would shift the burden of proof
away from the coastal state, who had been required under the
Fisheries Jurisdiction case to show intensive exploitation before
it could assert its preferential rights. To rebut this presumption,
the IDWN may either satisfy the requirements of Article 63, or
show that its fishing the adjacent high seas results in minimal
impact to straddling stocks.
Coastal states, therefore, should be permitted to apply do-
mestic law to IDWNs fishing straddling stocks on the adjacent
seas. Regulations of regional organizations should not govern
disputes between coastal states and IDWNs because IDWNs
should not benefit from an organization they do not support and,
in fact, willfully ignore. The ICJ should view the dispute as one
between two nations interested in a common resource, in which
one nation - the coastal state - has a priority over those re-
sources. The coastal state's domestic law will apply to IDWNs
only on the adjacent sea, which should be defined as either a
narrow band of high sea running parallel to the EEZ, or the
high seas portion of fishery grounds that extends beyond the
coastal state's EEZ. By granting the coastal state authority to
regulate IDWNs on the adjacent seas, the ICJ would create an
environment that encourages IDWNs to abide by international
law.
While coastal states may exercise domestic jurisdiction over
adjacent seas, limitations should exist to guard against coastal
state bias against IDWNs. One such limitation would be that
the coastal state could act unilaterally against IDWNs on the
adjacent seas only to the extent to which it has regulated itself
within its EEZ. If, for example, the coastal state has imposed a
moratorium upon certain stocks within its EEZ, the IDWN may
not fish those stocks on the adjacent seas. In addition, if the
coastal state regulates fishing equipment within its EEZ, then
the IDWN's use of equipment falls under those regulations. Lim-
iting the coastal state's regulatory authority on adjacent seas to
the extent of self-imposed regulation within its EEZ will prevent
coastal states from unreasonably and arbitrarily controlling the
IDWNs fishing the adjacent seas. This limitation incorporates
the Fisheries Jurisdiction rule that a coastal state's preferential
rights to adjacent seas are contingent on its dependence to those
resources because the coastal state's restrictions will vary as
stocks increase or decrease within its EEZ. When stocks flour-
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ish, few regulations will restrict fishing within the EEZ and,
therefore, fewer limitations will exist on IDWNs fishing the
adjacent seas. On the other hand, when straddling stocks are
limited, EEZ restrictions will increase, giving the coastal state
broader authority to enforce conservation on the adjacent sea.
If the coastal state imposes quotas upon straddling stocks
within its EEZ, the IDWN may fish those stocks provided it
demonstrates that its fishing will be in a reasonable manner and
with minimal impact. In other words, the presumption of an
IDWN's unreasonable fishing may be rebutted by a proper show-
ing. Coastal states would not, however, make this determina-
tion. Instead, the regional organization would apply both the
coastal state's domestic regulations and the regional
organization's considerations in determining a reasonable alloca-
tion for the IDWN. The IDWN could then fish the straddling
stock to its allotted amount. If the IDWN over-fishes its alloca-
tion, the coastal state could impose its domestic jurisdiction.
Such enforcement would impact regional fishing in two impor-
tant ways. First, it would strengthen the authority of the region-
al organization over the regulatory area by making it the ulti-
mate arbiter in disputes between coastal states and IDWNs.
Second, it would limit the coastal state's extension of jurisdiction
on the high seas. While the coastal state's preferential rights
exist on adjacent high seas, tempering those rights will curb
aggressive coastal state encroachment.
Applying these considerations to the instant dispute would
prevent Canada from acting unilaterally against Spain. Instead,
Canada would have been required to appeal to NAFO's regulato-
ry body to enforce the quota allocation.169 On the other hand, if
an IDWN nation had fished straddling stocks on the adjacent
sea, Canada's boarding and seizure of the fishing vessel, pursu-
ant to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, would have been
permissible. The IDWN, therefore, would be subject to Canada's
EEZ regulations. If the stocks fished were subject to a Canadian
moratorium, then the IDWN would too be barred from fishing
those stocks under Canadian law. On the other hand, if Canada
had placed quotas upon stocks fished by the IDWN, the IDWN
could fish those stocks subject to NAFO's determination of the
quota's reasonableness.
169. See NAFO Convention, supra note 32, arts. XVII, XVIII, and XIX.
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VI. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON STRADDLING STOCKS
Once ratified,' ° the United Nations Convention on Strad-
dling Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks'' (Convention) will
improve the management of this contentious area of high seas
fishing. While a thorough analysis of the Convention is outside
the scope of this Comment, a brief description of how it will
change the rights of coastal states and of nations fishing adja-
cent seas is valuable to understanding the future of straddling
stock fishing.
The Convention bestows a great deal of authority on region-
al organizations such as NAFO. On the subject of coastal states'
preferential rights versus distant water nations' ability to fish
adjacent seas, the Convention wisely grants regional organiza-
tions the authority to regulate straddling stocks.7 2 The Con-
vention notes that "states fishing for the stocks on the high
seas ... shall give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming
a member of such organization. . . or by agreeing to apply the
conservation measure and management measures established by
such an organization."' 3 Those nations refusing to abide by
the regional organization's regulations do not escape unregulat-
ed, as the Convention applies the regional organization's regula-
tions "de facto as extensively as possible to fishing activities in
the relevant area."'" 4 Therefore, because regional organizations
will govern all vessels fishing the adjacent seas, management
will improve.
The Convention also enables member nations to enforce the
regional organization's regulations. Members may board and
inspect any fishing vessels within the regulatory area to ensure
straddling stock conservation.' 5 In addition, Convention mem-
170. See Straddling Stock Convention, supra note 7, arts. 37-40. These articles
cover the requirements for ratification. The convention will enter into force upon
deposit of thirty instruments of ratification or accession. See id. art. 40. As of March
1, 1996, the Convention has twenty-nine signatories. The convention has yet to be
ratified by any of the signatories' legislatures or deposited with the Secretary-Gener-
al of the UN, as required by Article 38.
171. See id. arts. 37-40.
172. The very issue contested in the Canada-Spain conflict.
173. Straddling Stock Convention, supra note 7, art. 8, 3.
174. Id. art. 17, T 3.
175. See id. art. 21, 91 1.
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bers may secure evidence of violations and bring the offending
vessel to the nearest port." The Convention, however, re-
quires the inspecting nation to give the seized vessel's flag state
notice of the pending inspection. 7 '
By granting regional organizations management authority,
the Convention chose the most equitable solution. Nations fish-
ing regionally regulated areas may join the governing body and
advocate their interest. Member nations will enjoy all the bene-
fits and obligations of membership, but most importantly they
will have access to the regional area's resources. If the Conven-
tion had instead given coastal states the exclusive right to man-
age straddling stocks, distant water nations could be unilaterally
excluded from the fishing zone with no viable recourse.
VII. CONCLUSION
During the past century, coastal states have enjoyed im-
mense expansion of their fishing zones. At the same time they
continue to lay claim to preferential rights to manage straddling
stocks. This places straddling stock management at a significant
crossroads since coastal states have yet to relinquish their inter-
est to the increasingly influential regional fishing organizations.
The opportunity to affirm the international community's prefer-
ence of the authority of regional organizations over coastal
states is before both the ICJ in connection with the Canada-
Spain dispute and the world fishing community in connection
with the Convention.
As it is uncertain whether the Convention will be ratified,
the ICJ should decisively rule whether coastal states may act
unilaterally on the high seas. This Comment urges the ICJ to
affirm regional organizations' authority over their members and
resources. The ICJ should also use coastal states' interests in
straddling stocks as a means to influence IDWNs to abide by
their international obligations. On the other hand, ratification of
176. See id. art. 21, T 8. If this provision had been in force at the time of
Canada's seizure of the Spanish vessel, Canada's action would have been justified.
The Spanish vessel was accused of violating NAFO regulations by fishing with pro-
hibited gear (see NAFO Convention, supra note 32, art. 21, § 11(e)) and fishing
American plaice, a stock subject to a NAFO moratorium (see NAFO Convention,
supra note 32, art. 21, § 11(c)).
177. See Straddling Stock Convention, supra note 7, art. 21, 4.
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the Convention by the international community will grant re-
gional organizations, not coastal states, de facto power over
IDWNs.
A resolution for straddling stocks issues appears within
reach. The ICJ's pending decision as advocated in this Comment,
and the Convention's implementation will curb coastal states'
preferential rights. While coastal states may lose their preferen-
tial rights, the strengthening of regional organizations will pro-
vide for the conservation and management of straddling stocks
in the most equitable manner, thus preserving the sea's resourc-
es for future generations.
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